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by planting new mines, which the PKK 
denies. Field research done in the Kurdish 
Dicle district, which was conducted by the 
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey on behalf 
of the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines to 
examine incidents in 2007, suggests a different 
picture. Local communities reported that the 
incidents were caused by “old” mines laid by 
the security forces. The victims are mostly 
poor Kurdish villagers who were evacuated 
in 1991–1992 and have now returned to their 
villages. According to them, many minefields 
are insufficiently marked or completely 
unmarked. The returning villagers are in 
danger when going to their fields, vineyards, 
gardens and water resources. Additionally, 
MRE is almost non-existent in the affected 
regions, except for some warning signs by the 
Turkish Army in some areas.
The Turkish government plans to issue a 
tender for commercial companies to demine 
areas along the Syrian border.10 Clearance of 
all mined areas on the Syrian border would 
cost around US$600 million and would be 
undertaken by companies that would use the 
land for agriculture in order to create new 
employment opportunities in the region. 
Should this plan work out, it would confiscate 
a 510-kilometre-long (317-mile-long) stretch 
of mostly fertile land and grant it to big com-
panies, potentially hindering the small farm-
ers from going back to their villages, unless 
they become low-paid wage workers.
Iraq: Unifying Mine Action
Some 5.5 million people live in the 
Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, of which 
four million are Kurds. The Landmine 
Monitor puts it clearly: “The Kurdish gover-
norates, some of the most contaminated areas 
of the world with 1,428 affected communities, 
contend with thousands of tactical minefields 
on the borders with Iran and Turkey and fur-
ther contamination along the Green Line, 
the former frontline between Kurdish forces 
and Saddam Hussein’s Army, as well as UXO 
across all three governorates.”11 Four thou-
sand out of 5,000 villages were destroyed dur-
ing the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, 
and many of them were mined after the evacu-
ation. Between 1991 and 2000 alone, 10,997 
mine/UXO casualties were reported in six 
governorates of northern Iraq; 3,697 people 
were killed and 7,300 injured.
The first Kurdish rebellion in modern 
Iraq started in 1961 under the leadership of 
Mustafa Barzani, the father of today’s Regional 
President Masud Barzani. In 1970, the autono-
mous Kurdistan region was established for 
the first time in an agreement with the central 
government in Baghdad. But from then until 
1991, its status was disputed and subject to 
violent conflicts. The most infamous event in 
this series of conflicts was the “Anfal” cam-
paign by Saddam Hussein’s forces with the use 
of chemical weapons and a poison-gas attack 
against the Kurdish town of Halabja.
Following an insurgency, in the aftermath 
of the first Iraq conflict, and with military 
support by the United States and its allies, the 
Kurdish parties Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
and Kurdistan Democratic Party took control 
of the region in October 1991. After the start 
of the Iraq War in 2003, the Kurdistan region 
became a semi-autonomous, federally recog-
nised, political entity. However, the Kurdistan 
region remains part of the Federal Republic 
of Iraq, and PUK leader Jalal Talabani is 
the President of Iraq. Both the PUK and the 
KDP, forming a coalition now in the region, 
are committed to mine action. Even before 
the invasion of Iraq by the United States and 
its allies in 2003, as de facto authorities in 
northern Iraq, they signed and implemented 
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in 2002. 
The two existing mine-action centres in Arbil 
and Suleymaniyah are conducting demining 
and MRE programmes on a large scale. Mines 
Advisory Group, since 1992, and Norwegian 
People’s Aid, since 1997, have been conduct-
ing such programmes, too. On a small scale, 
the PPK is also demining for humanitarian 
purposes and carries out ad hoc MRE in the 
Qandeel Mountains.
The Kurdish Parliament passed a law uni-
fying the two existing mine-action centres 
into the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency, 
something it had done even before Iraq recently 
Collected UXO in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007.
joined the Ottawa Convention. A unified 
mine-action agency for the whole region is a 
big step toward further strengthening of mine 
action and toward a mine-free Kurdistan.
Conclusion
While the situation varies in each of the 
four states with Kurdish populations—Syria, 
Iran, Turkey and Iraq—Kurds are demand-
ing rights on every level in the midst of local 
and global conflicts. These conflicts create the 
need for organised mine action and Kurdish 
regional legislation to protect the local popu-
lations from UXO and landmines. 
See Endnotes, page 110
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he Middle East and North Africa region is affected by mines/
ERW because of the many wars and conflicts this region wit-
nessed since the 1940s through today. Historically and geo-
graphically, the mine/ERW problem began in MENA around the end of 
World War II in North Africa, and continued through the invasion of 
Iraq by Coalition Forces in 2003. In addition, a number of internal con-
flicts and wars have resulted in contamination. These internal conflicts 
have taken place in: Oman (1964–1975), Lebanon (1975–1990), Yemen 
(1994) and Algeria (1991–present). Securing borders and strategic loca-
tions are other reasons for existing mines in Algeria, Egypt, Israel 
Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and maybe other countries.
Tons of Explosives Available for Use
There are 15 affected countries and territories in MENA contami-
nated with millions of mines and ERW. Some of those countries have 
declared the numbers of mines and ERW in their lands, though others 
have not as they do not know how many remain. All affected countries, 
however, have projections based on estimated affected land and previous 
demining operations. 
Regional projections vary greatly, totaling 52–66 million mines and 
ERW. The estimated contaminations of each country are as follows:
• Algeria: 2,783,555
• Egypt: 21,600,000 (only 20–25 percent are mines)
• Iran: 12–16 million
• Iraq: 8–12 million before the 2003 Coalition invasion, which 
surely increased those numbers
• Israel: 260,000, emplanted by Israel for security reasons
• Jordan: 203,000
• Kuwait: small number after clearance of 5–7 million
• Lebanon: 406,000 mines and 4 million ERW, the majority of 
which are cluster submunitions left after the last Israeli conflict 
with Hezbollah/Lebanon in July and August 2006
• Libya: 1.5–3 million
• Syria: 500,000
• Tunisia: 3,240 mines and an unknown number of ERW
• Yemen: 150,000 to 2 million
In Oman, Palestine and Western Sahara, the numbers of mines and 
ERW are unknown.
Given the fact that the aforementioned mines and ERW differ in type 
and composition, the amount of live explosives they contain differs, too. 
On average, the live explosives can be estimated at 0.25 grams (0.88 
Landmines/Explosive Remnants of War and the War
on Terrorism in the MENA
by Ayman Sorour 
[ Protection Against Armaments & Consequences ]
This article looks at the relationship between the existing landmine and explosive remnants of war1 problem in 
the Middle East and North Africa, and terrorist activities in the area by explaining the scope of the mine/ERW 
problem in the region; the huge availability of explosives for use in illegal activities, particularly terrorism; and 
the case of Algeria and Egypt being affected by recent terrorist acts.
T ounces) per item,2 which means the quantity of available live explosives in MENA is between 13,151 and 16,489 metric tons (16,229 U.S. tons). These explosives are not secured and cannot be secured due to the fact 
that the large part of lands where they are found is not easily accessible 
for political reasons, as in Iraq, or because no survey has been com-
pleted, as in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. 
The first question that may come to mind is: How easy is it to clear 
such mines and ERW, considering the very low level of practical experi-
ence of those who do it? The answer is that it is undoubtedly risky and 
dangerous work, but in some affected countries, mines and ERW can 
be found on the land’s surface, like the way the Iraqi Army planted 
landmines in Kuwait. Previous munitions stores and abandoned arms 
caches, such as the many the Iraqi Army left behind after the initial 
Coalition Forces invasion in 2003, are also obvious locations. In other 
places, locals may have little experience to help them clear mines and 
ERW. For instance, Polisario said mines it has are those it cleared from 
the Moroccan defensive walls built to divide Western Sahara between 
them and Morocco. Consequently, the possibility of mine and ERW 
clearance by a person with a very low level of experience is a reality. 
Explosives for Free and Illegal Activities
It is not known when explosives from mines and ERW were first 
used in illegal activities, but it is not a recent occurrence. Explosives 
from mines and ERW have historically been used in fishing and min-
ing operations, providing a cheap and easy method for both activities. 
Some Bedouins in remote areas use these explosives to secure their pri-
vate properties from thieves or to secure their drug plants from others, 
including police forces. 
Since 2003, explosives from mines and ERW have been used in ter-
rorist acts in MENA. In Iraq, a 2003 attack against the United Nations 
headquarters in Baghdad resulted in the death of the U.N. envoy to Iraq 
and the death and injury of more than a dozen others. This terrorist 
attack was one of the biggest uses of that type of explosive; this use of 
explosives continues in Iraq. Similar terrorist acts occurred in Sinai, 
Egypt, in October 2004, July 2005 and in April 2006. The government 
admitted that explosives in those terrorist acts were taken from mines 
and ERW. Although the Algerian government did not announce the ori-
gin of explosives used by the two car bombers in April 2007 who attacked 
the government building and police station in Algiers, and a suicide car 
bomber in Lakhdaria (80 kilometers [50 miles] from Algiers), explosives 
may have come from mines/ERW. Recently in Yemen, the government 
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explosives used is unknown, indicates a high 
possibility that recovered mine and ERW 
explosives were used.
Additionally, police arrested a small group 
of criminals with 188 French APID51 mines3 
they had removed from old minefields to use 
in fishing. In July 2007, the police force of 
Tlemcen in West Algeria arrested a criminal 
group of eight for transferring and stockpil-
ing anti-personnel mines. The criminal group 
would remove anti-personnel mines from 
the mined area of Ain-El-Safra, El-Na’ama 
governorate, and transfer them to the Salam 
Belashash area, near the border with Morocco, 
to remove TNT and then sell it. The author-
ity arrested part of the group while they 
were transferring 100 APMs, and then found 
another 289 APMs cached in Ain-El-Safra.
Conclusion
Analyzing the similarities between terror-
ist attacks in Egypt and Algeria will clarify the 
connection between terrorist groups in both 
countries, reflected in these groups’ usage of 
recovered landmines and ERW in suicide-
bomber cars as well as a common membership 
in Al-Qaida. The huge amounts of explosives 
available from mines and ERW throughout 
MENA, and confirmed and suspected use 
in previous terrorist acts, should alarm us. 
Officials are encouraged to study such rela-
tions carefully and be ready to deal with them, 
particularly in the absence of any mine-action 
programs in these countries. 
See Endnotes, page 110
For additional references for this article, 
please visit http://tinyurl.com/3zxqsl.
warned the Al-Houthi group and its followers about using landmines in 
their ongoing conflict against government forces in the governorate of 
Sa’Ada in northern Yemen.
In all MENA countries, possession of explosives in any form or type 
without permission from the authorities (the army or the police) is pro-
hibited. Violation of such laws could cost the guilty person his life or 
require that he spend the rest of his life in jail. However, this appears not 
to be a deterrent to the violators.
The Case of Egypt
Egypt is affected by 21.6 million mines and ERW in the western area 
of the country because of WWII and the Israeli-Egyptian wars in Sinai 
and the Red Sea area. Because 75 to 80 percent of this number is ERW, 
explosives comprising those mines and ERW are estimated at 5,400 met-
ric tons (5,315 U.S. tons). Most affected areas in Egypt are not marked or 
fenced because old fences have been stolen or have disappeared due to 
either climate conditions or carelessness by officials; yet in most affected 
areas, local people, who in some areas are Bedouin, know quite well the 
affected or suspected areas. They gained this knowledge by living with 
mines and ERW for many years and from the many accidents that hap-
pened to their families or animals. 
In October 2004, four explosions that targeted three tourist sites 
in Taba and Dahab in Sinai, 450 kilometers (280 miles) east of Cairo, 
resulted in the death and injury of more than 150 persons. In July 2005, 
two explosions targeted a tourist site and parking nearby in Sharm el-
Sheikh, South Sinai, and resulted in the death and injury of more than 
300 persons. In April 2006, five explosions, three of them targeting the 
tourist area of Dahab, Sinai, resulted in the death and injury of more 
than 100 persons. The other two explosions targeted the multinational 
force in the El-Goura area, although there were no casualties. According 
to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, explosives used in these incidents 
were taken from mines and ERW in Sinai.
In 2006, there were many reports on the transfer and stockpiling of 
landmines and explosive remnants of war by individuals. In May 2006, a 
farmer in Ismailia, located 120 kilometers (75 miles) northwest of Cairo, 
found 210 pieces of unexploded ordnance and 4,000 bullets on his land 
while he was preparing it for cultivation. The same month, the police 
forces found 20 active landmines among packages of TNT in a cave 
in Risan Mountain on the Sinai Peninsula. In June 2006, police forces 
found pieces of unexploded ordnance—such as air-dropped bombs, 
ordnance and artillery shells—in the Al-Khutmiyah area. In October 
2006, the police arrested a scrap dealer in Al-Arish city of North Sinai 
for possessing 64 landmines. The man said he used to clear landmines 
himself, remove the explosives and sell the metal from the landmines. 
The difficult experience Egypt has faced in Sinai from terrorist acts using 
explosives from mines and ERW, and the possible use of such explosives 
again, highlights the need to study the situation carefully. 
The Case of Algeria
Algeria is affected by 2,783,555 mines and ERW on its borders 
with Tunisia in the east and Morocco in the west.2 This contamina-
tion results from the colonial era and ongoing fighting with terrorist 
groups, mainly the Salafist Group for Jihad, 
which recently joined Al-Qaida and renamed 
itself “Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic 
Maghreb Countries.” The estimated explo-
sives in mines and ERW in Algeria amount to 
696 metric tons (685 U.S. tons). Many affected 
areas in Algeria are not marked or fenced as 
old fences have been stolen or have disap-
peared either because of climate conditions 
or because of official carelessness. Terrorist 
groups in Algeria have used landmines and 
improvised explosives devices against secu-
rity forces since the early 1990s. In August 
2006, 31 military persons were injured 
because terrorist groups planted landmines 
and booby traps in the Boumhani forest in 
east El-Bouira governorate, East Algiers, 
when security forces were following them. In 
October 2006, three soldiers were killed and 
another 15 injured in a similar operation in 
Béjaïa governorate. In April 2007, two explo-
sions, one of them targeting the government 
palace in Center Algiers and the other target-
ing a police station in East Algiers, resulted 
in the death and injury of more than 160 
persons. In July 2007, an explosion targeted 
a military base in Al-Akhdaria area, Bouira 
governorate, resulting in the death and injury 
of more than 30 military personnel. Although 
authorities did not announce or confirm that 
explosives used in those acts came from mines 
or ERW, the fact that the terrorist group in 
Algeria is part of Al-Qaida, which uses the 
same methods in Iraq, and that the source of 
Algerian anti-personnel mines before being destroyed as part of stockpile destruction, Hasi Bahbah, South Algeria, May 2005. 
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Robotic Ankle Research Takes Step in Right Direction
Garth Stewart, 24, lost part of his leg while serving with the U.S. Army in Iraq. In the summer 
of 2007, he took a big step toward improved recovery with the world’s first robotic ankle. The 
device, which is unique in design and function, uses tendon-like springs and an electric motor 
to propel the user forward. This forward motion helps reduce fatigue while improving balance 
and providing a better, more fluid gait.
Conventional prostheses have a passive response toward walking, requiring more energy expen-
diture for amputees with prostheses than those with a robotic ankle. The new ankle was created 
through the Center for Restorative and Regenerative Medicine, a collaborative effort that in-
cludes the Providence (Rhode Island) Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center, Brown University and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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